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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that this
action for the recovery of sewer fees paid under protest is
barred by the statute of limitations contained in U.C.A. §78-1231?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover sewer service fees paid
under protest.

The trial court granted defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment and dismissed the action as barred by the sixmonth statute of limitations contained in U.C.A. §78-12-31.
29; Add. 13.)

(R.

Plaintiff here appeals from that Order of

dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant-Respondent Salt Lake City Suburban
Sanitary District (the "District") was formed in 1953 pursuant to
U.C.A., Title 17, Chapter 6. (Aff't of Emil Meyer, R. 21? Add.
9.)

The District is authorized by law to impose charges for

sewer services provided to customers and to "adopt such
resolutions as may be necessary to assure the collection and
enforcement of all fees and charges so imposed."

U.C.A. §17-6-

3.8(d); see also §17-6-3.4. On April 23, 1982, the District's
Board of Trustees adopted by resolution a policy of commencing
sewer service charges at the time connection fees are paid by the

recipient of the service.

The purpose of the policy is to avoid

the unreasonably burdensome task of monitoring when each
recipient is actually using the service.

(Meyer Aff't 1[4, Add.

10.)
Plaintiff-Appellant Ponderosa One Limited Partnership
("Ponderosa") constructed apartment buildings on its real
property located in Salt Lake County within the boundaries of the
defendant Sanitary District.

On or about December 27, 1984f

Lewis Hildreth, general partner of Ponderosa, went to the
District's office to pay the sewer connection fee for the
apartments.

Prior to receiving payment, Carol Brand, the

District's secretary, informed Mr. Hildreth of the District's
policy to commence charges for sewer services upon payment of the
connection fee. Mr. Hildreth paid the connection fee after that
policy was explained to him.

(R. 2-5; Add. 1-4. Aff't of Carol

Brand R.23; Add. 11.)
The District billed Ponderosa for sewer service for the
period of May 1, 1985 through August 31, 1985 in the amount of
$2,800.00.

Ponderosa paid the service fee under protest on June

24, 1985. Ponderosa instituted this action on March 2, 1986 for
a refund of the service fee paid under protest.

(R. 2-5; Add. 1-

4. Meyer Aff't, Add. 10.) The District moved for summary
judgment, supported by a legal memorandum and affidavits, on the
-2-

basis that the action is barred by the six-month statute of
limitations contained in U.C.A. §78-12-31(2).
statute, Add. 15.)
affidavits.

(R. 13. See

Ponderosa filed no opposing memorandum or

The trial court granted summary judgmentr holding

that this action for the recovery of sewer fees paid under
protest is barred by §78-12-31.

(R. 29; Add. 13.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Actions for the recovery of sewer fees paid under
protest are authorized and governed by U.C.A. §59-11-11. The
applicable statute of limitations for actions under §59-11-11 is
U.C.A. §78-12-31(2).

This action is barred because it was filed

after expiration of the six-month limitation period.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THIS ACTION FOR
THE RECOVERY OF SEWER FEES PAID UNDER PROTEST IS BARRED BY THE
SIX-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN U.C.A. §78-1231(2).
Actions for the recovery of charges levied by and paid
under protest to public entities are authorized under U.C.A. §5911-11, which states:
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other
demands for public revenue which is deemed unlawful by
the party whose property is thus taxed, or from whom
such tax or license is demanded or enforced, such party
may pay under protest such tax or license, or any part
thereof deemed unlawful, to the officers designated and
authorized by law to collect the same; and thereupon
the party so paying or his legal representative may
-3-

bring an action in the tax division of the appropriate
district court against the officer to whom said tax or
license was paidf or against the State, county,
municipality or other taxing unit on whose behalf the
same was collected, to recover said tax or license or
any portion thereof paid under protest.
[Add. 15,
emphasis added.]
By its express terms, this statute applies not only to taxes paid
under protest, but also to "other demands for public revenue"
paid under protest.
In Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980),
this Court held that §59-11-11 applies to sewer fees paid under
protest.

In Rupp, the city discontinued water service to the

plaintiffs as a means of enforcing the city's mandatory sewer
connection ordinance.

Plaintiffs sued, alleging that the city

had no authority to mandate connection to the new sewage system,
and that the termination of their water service without a hearing
deprived them of property without due process of law.

Regarding

the first argument, which has no relevance to the present case,
the Court held that the city could validly compel connection with
the sewer system pursuant to its police power.

Regarding the

second argument, the Court held that due process was not violated
because §59-11-11 afforded an adeguate procedure to test the
legality of the ordinance.

The Court held that under that

statutory procedure the plaintiffs, rather than withholding the

-4-

sewer fee, should have paid the fee under protest and then sued
for a refund:
(I]n the present situation, access to formal judicial
proceedings is facilitated by 59-11-11 which allows the
plaintiff to tender the payments required under protest
and secure the continuation of water services while
insuring a subsequent judicial proceeding in the
matter. [610 P.2d at 341-42-]
Thus, Rupp expressly holds that the proper procedure to challenge
the imposition of a sewer fee is to pay the fee under protest and
then sue for recovery of the fee pursuant to §59-11-11.
In Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), this
Court reaffirmed that actions authorized under §59-11-11 are
governed by the six-month statute of limitations contained in
O.C.A. §78-12-31:
The cause of action authorized under §59-11-11 has its
own notice provision in the form of the requirement to
pay the tax under protest and has its own statute of
limitation. See U.C.A., 1953, §78-12-31. [Id. at 1154.]
This Court had previously observed in Peterson v. Bountiful City,
25 Utah 2d 126, 477 P.2d 153 (1970), that an action to recover
monies paid to governmental entities under protest "must be
commenced within six-months." _Ic[. 477 P.2d at 156.
Section 78-12-31(2) sets forth the six-month
limitations period on actions to recover funds paid to public
entities under protest.

That statute reads, in relevant part:

-5-

Within six months:
An action
facto:
•

against

an officer, or an officer de

• • •

(2)
For money paid to any such officer under
protest, or seized by such officer in his official
capacity, as collector of taxes, and which, it is
claimed, ought to be refunded. [Add. 15.]
Consistent with §59-11-11, the statute of limitations, by its
very terms, is not limited in application to actions for taxes
paid under protest, but applies to any "money paid to any such
officer under protest."

The limitations period begins to run at

the time the money is paid under protest.

See Neilson v. San

Pete County, 40 Utah 560, 123 P. 334, 337 (1912) (decided under
similar statute).
Ponderosa paid the sewer service fee in this case on
June 24, 1985, thus commencing the limitations period.

Ponderosa

filed this action to recover that fee on March 2, 1986, almost
nine months after the protested payment.

Therefore, this action

is clearly barred by the statute of limitations in §78-12-31(2),
and the trial court's Order of summary judgment on that basis was
correct.
Ponderosa does not dispute that the correct statute of
limitations for actions under §59-11-11 is the six-month statute
contained in §78-12-31.

Rather, Ponderosa challenges only the
-6-

first prong of the foregoing analysis by arguing that §59-11-11
applies only to actions for the recovery of taxes paid under
protest and not to sewer fees paid under protest.

Ponderosa

argues that a sewer fee is not a tax and that its recovery is
therefore not governed by §59-11-11 or its corresponding statute
of limitations.

(Appellant1s Brief pp. 4-5.)

Ponderosa argues

that while Rupp treated the sewer connection fee as a taxf this
Court

should

not

treat

a

(Appellant's Brief pp. 5-6.)

sewer

service

fee

as

a

tax.

Thus, Ponderosa attempts to make an

artificial distinction between sewer connection fees and sewer
service fees.
However, any supposed distinction between connection
and service fees makes no difference in this case because Rupp
did not hold that the connection fee was a tax.

It is undisputed

that sewer assessments are "not in fact a tax but instead a
charge for services which the legislature has permitted water and
sewage districts to impose."

Murray City v. Board of Education

of Murray City School District, 16 Utah 2d 115, 396 P.2d 628, 629
(1964).

Moreover the Court in Rupp did not need to hold that the

sewer fee was a tax in order to make it recoverable under §59-1111.

As noted above, §59-11-11 applies not only to taxes and

licenses, but also to "other demands for public revenue" deemed
unlawful and paid under protest.
-7-

Neither did the trial court in

the present case find that the challenged sewer fee was a tax;
such a finding was unnecessary to the court's holding.

The trial

court simply followed Rupp and held that because an action for
the * recovery of a sewer fee paid under protest is governed by
§59-11-11, the applicable statute of limitations is §78-12-31.1
Ponderosa

also attempts

to distinguish

Rupp on the

faulty basis that the city there, in compelling connection with
the sewer system, was exercising
(Appellant's

Brief

immaterial.

pp.

6-7.)

its sovereign police power.
However,

this

distinction

is

The police power was invoked to compel connection to

the sewer system, not to impose the connection fee. The exercise
of police power was unrelated to the imposition of the sewer fee
and did not transform that fee into a tax.
not

dealing

connection

to

with
the

sovereign
sewer

police

system,

with

In this case, we are

power,
a

with

tax,

or

mandatory
with

the

distinction between the proprietary and governmental roles of a
municipality.

The only issue here is whether this action to

recover the challenged sewer fee is governed by §59-11-11.

x

If it

It should be noted that plaintiff originally
challenged the sewer fee on the supposed basis that it is an
illegal tax. (Complaint, Add. 3-4.) Thus, plaintiff's
current argument that the fee is not a tax is both
contradictory and defeats plaintiff's claim on the merits.
-8-

is, as this Court held in Rupp, then the action is barred by the
statute of limitations in §78-12-31.

Ponderosa's attempts to

sidestep and distinguish Rupp are simply without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the defendant Salt Lake City
Suburban Sanitary District urges this Court to affirm the trial
court's judgment dismissing this action on the basis that it is
barred by the six-month statute of limitations contained in §7812-31(2).
Dated this

/7*^day of December, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

By <&tft.j0'i^

-&£&*,

David M. Wahlguist
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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JERROLD S. JENSEN #1678
Attorney for Plaintiff
#9 Exchange Placef Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 355-54.90
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PONDEROSA ONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a Utah limited partnership,
C O M P L A I N T

Plaintiff,
vs.
C i v i l No*

SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN
SANITARY DISTRICT,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Plaintiff and complains against Defendant as
follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah limited partnership and the

owner of real property located in Salt Lake County on the
northeast corner of 3900 South and 700 West,
2.

Plaintiff is an improvement district established

pursuant to a resolution of the Salt Lake County Commissioners as
authorized by S 17-7-11, Utah Code Annotated.

ciLp-^

o*^***

3.

Plaintiff constructed apartments, known as Mountain

Shadow Apartments, on the above-described property, which is
located within the boundaries of Defendant's improvemerft district.
4.

On or about December 27, 1984, Lewis Hildreth,

president of Ponderosa Equities Company, a Nevada corporation,
and general partner of Plaintiff, personally went to the offices
of Defendant for the purpose of paying the sewer connection fee
for the Mountain Shadow Apartments in the amount of $122,500.
5.

Construction began on the Mountain Shadow Apartments

in January 1985 for the first of seven buildings.

Thereafter,

the remaining six buildings were commenced in February and March
1985.

The first of seven buildings were completed in August of

1985 with the last ones being completed in October of 1985.
6.

Certificates of Occupancy were issued by Salt

Lake County on the first units completed in August 1985 and on
the last units completed in October 1985.
7.

Defendant billed Plaintiff for sewer fees for the

period May 1, 1985 to August 31, 1985 in the amount of $2800,
which amount has been paid by Plaintiff, but which amount Plaintiff has requested a refund as a result of payment by mistake.
8.

The reason for the request for a refund of the $2800

is that the sewer for said apartments was not in use during the

o
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period billed and therefore was not reasonably calculated to the
cost of the service provided.
9.

Sewer connections were not made to the units until

the units were nearly completed.
10.

Prior to July 1984f Defendant did not charge sewer

fees until apartment units were completed.

In July 1984f

Defendant changed its policy and began charging fees at the time
the connection fee was made.
11.

According to the Board of Trustees, applicants are

notified at the time the sewer connection fee is paid that sewer
fees will commence upon payment of the connection fee.
12#

This policy was never explained to Mr. Hildreth.

13.

Had Mr. Hildreth known that this was the policy of

Defendant, Plaintiff would have not paid the sewer connection
fee until nearer the end of construction of the Mountain Shadow
project.
14.

Defendant's policy is arbitrary and capricious, not

in keeping with that of other improvement districts, and is
unreasonable when the policy is not explained to apartment
owners.
15.

To charge customers a fee for services not rendered

constitutes the imposition of an £d valorum tax by Defendant

-3o

contrary to the authority granted to improvment d stricts
pursuant to §§17-7-1 et. £e£. Utah Code Annotated and the
Constitutiuon of the State of Utah*
16.

Since the payment of the original sewer fee of

$2800, Plaintiff has been required to pay additional sewer servic
fees, for which service has not been provided as a result of the
apartment units not being occupied.
WHEREFOFE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against
Defendant as follows:
1.

For an order that Defendant's assessment of sewer

fees to Plaintiff constitutes an ac[ valorum tax in violation of
the Constitution and laws of the State of Utah.
2.

For an order declaring that sewer service fees are

not to be imposed until Plaintiff's apartment units are occupied,,
3.

For a return of all monies paid by Plaintiff to

Defendant as a sewer service fee prior to occcupany of said
units.
4.

For such other and further relief as to the Court

seems just and equitable.
DATED this

day of March, 1986.

KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
DAVID M. WAHLQUIST - A3349
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
330 SOUTH THIRD EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH
PONDEROSA ONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a Utah limited partnership,
ANSWER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C86-2328

SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN SANITARY
DISTRICT,
Defendant.

Defendant SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN SANITARY DISTRICT
NO. 1 hereby answers plaintiff's Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Defendant

lacks

sufficient

information

upon

which to base a belief regarding the truth of allegations
contained

in

paragraph

1

of

plaintiff's

Complaint

and

therefore denies the same.
2.

Defendant

admits

paragraph

3.

Defendant

lacks

sufficient

2

of

plaintiff's

Complaint.
information

upon

which to base a belief regarding the truth of allegations
contained
icConkl*

in

paragraph

therefore denies the same.

3

of

plaintiff's

Complaint

and

II

2.

4.
defendant

Answering paragraph 4 of plaintiff's Complaint,

admits

that

on or about December 27/ 1984 LEWIS

HILDRETH personally appeared at defendant's offices and paid a
sewer connection fee for the MOUNTAIN SHADOW APARTMENTS in the
amount of $122/500.00 but lacks sufficient information upon
which to base a belief regarding the remaining allegations in
said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
5.

Defendant

lacks

sufficient

information

upon

which to base a belief regarding the truth of allegations
contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of plaintiff's Complaint and
therefore denies the same.
6.

Answering paragraph 7 of plaintiff's Complaint/

defendant admits that plaintiff has been billed for sewer fees
for the period May 1, 1985 to August 31, 1985 in the amount of
$2/800.00

and

that

said

amount

has

been

paid

but

lacks

sufficient information upon which to base a belief regarding
the

truth

of

the

remaining

allegations

contained

in said

paragraph and therefore denies the same.
7.

Defendant

lacks

sufficient

information

upon

which to base a belief regarding the truth of allegations
contained in pargaraphs 8 and 9 of plaintiff's Complaint and
therefore denies the same.
8.

Defendant

plaintiff's Complaint.

,*•
*•*

admits

paragraphs

10

and

11

of

3.

9.

Defendant

denies paragraphs

12, 13 and 14 of

plaintiff's Complaint.
10. Answering paragraph 15 of plaintiff's Complaint/
defendant

denies

the

allegations

contained

therein

and

affirmatively alleges that any activity as engaged in does not
constitute the imposition of an ad valorum tax for services
not rendered and that any such activity was entirely within
the authority granted to it as an improvement district.
11. Answering paragraph 16 of plaintiff's Complaint,
defendant admits that plaintiff has been charged sewer fees in
addition to the $2,800.00 originally paid by plaintiff but
denies

each

and

every

other allegation

contained

in said

paragraph.
12. Defendant denies each and every other allegation
contained in plaintiff's Complaint to the extent not expressly
admitted herein.
SECOND DEFENSE
13. Plaintiff's

Complaint

fails to state a claim

against this defendant upon which relief can be granted.
THIRD DEFENSE
14. Plaintiff is estopped from bringing this action
because he was informed in advance that once he paid the fees
under the District's policy he would be charged for use costs
and in spite of such information chose to pay the fees on
December 27, 1984.

n

4.

FOURTH DEFENSE
15. Plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages and
is directly the cause of the damage for which it seeks relief.
FIFTH DEFENSE
16. This

action

is

barred

by

the

Statute

of

Limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.
WHEREFORE, defendant requests the Court to dismiss
plaintiff's Complaint against it with prejudice and to award
defendant its costs herein.
DATED this 23rd day of April 1986.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

DAVID M. W A H L Q U I S T A
Attorneys for defend^
HAND DELIVER CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to:
Jerrold S. Jensen
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
DAVID M. WAHLQUIST - A 3349
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
330 SOUTH THIRD EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE
(801) 521-3680

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PONDEROSA ONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
a Utah limited partnership,

AFFIDAVIT OF EMIL MEYER

Plaintiff

v.

Civil No. C-86-2328

SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN
SANITARY DISTRICT,

Judge Frederick

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

SS
I, EMIL MEYER, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and
say as follows:
1.

At all times relevant to this action I have been

general manager of defendant SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN SANITARY DISTRICT
NO. 1 ("San'tary District").
2.

The Sanitary District is a county improvement district

established under Utah Code Ann. Title 17, Chapter 6.

3.

With the formation of the Sanitary District in 1953,

the trustees adopted an ordinance establishing charges for sewer services
provided to its customers pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Title 17, Chapter 6.
4.

On April 23, 1982, the trustees of the Sanitary District

established a policy of commencing sewer service charges when connection or
capacity fees are paid by the recipient of the service.

The purpose of the

policy is to avoid the unreasonably burdensome task of monitoring when each
recipient is actually using the sewer service.
5.

On June 24, 1985, Ponderosa paid the sewer service charges

under protest.
DATED this

Jj ?

day of

^>7a^

EMIL MEYER

1986.

*—f

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this > 7
ytfa^

Co-omission Expires:

±U

day of

, 1986.

£s*M6Z
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
DAVID M. WAHLQUIST - A 3349
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
330 SOUTH THIRD EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE (801) 521-3680

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PONDEROSA ONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
a Utah limited partnership,
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF CAROL BRAND
v.
Civil No. C-86-2328
SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN
SANITARY DISTRICT,

Judge Frederick

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
) ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, CAROL BRAND, being first duly sworn, hereby depose
and say as follows:
1.

At all times relevant to this action I was a clerk

of defendant SALT LAKE CITY SURBURBAN SANITARY DISTRICT NO. 1
("Sanitary District").
2.

On December 27, 1984, a representative c. plaintiff

PONDEROSA ONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ("Ponderosa") came to the

•« t

offices of the Sanitary District to pay connection fees for
Ponderosa's property on 3900 South and 700 West in Salt Lake
County.

Before payment was tendered, I informed tne represen-

tative of the Sanitary District's policy to commence sewer
service charges when the connection fees are paid.

Ponderosa's

representative then tendered payment for the connection fees.
Dated this P

9^

— d a y of (\jjcu.

' 1986.

Carol Brand

a

U+s

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this gf - day of
1986.

IC, Residing in
TARY PUBLT"
, Utah
My Commission Expires:

-2-
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
DAVID M. WAHLQUIST - A 3349
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
330 SOUTH THIRD EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE (801) 521-3680

JW.L 1
H D.'>cn (• J fay'J
By
Wt

<J . . C ' J

L

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PONDEROSA ONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
a Utah limited partnership,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. C-86-2328
SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN
SANITARY DISTRICT,

Judge Frederick

Defendant*

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against
plaintiff PONDEROSA ONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP came on for hearing
before the above-entitled court on June 23, 1986, at the hour of
10:00 a.m.

Plaintiff appeared by its counsel of record, Jerrold

S. Jensen.

Defendant appeared by its counsel of record, David M,

Wahlquist of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell.
Having heard argument of counsel and read memoranda
filed by the parties and being otherwise advised in the premises,
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS:
* 1

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against plaintiff PONDEROSA ONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is granted because plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations contained
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.
DATED this

ATTEST

TTnTh 1986.
BY THE

H.0JXONHINDLEY
Ctork

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, postage prepaid, this *J_^ir-- /
day of June, 1986, to:
Jerrold S. Jensen
9 Exchange Place, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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59-11-11. Payment under protest — Action to recover.
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for public revenue
which is deemed unlawful by the party whose property is thus taxed, or
from whom such tax or license is demanded or enforced, such partv may
pay under protest such tax or license, or any part thereof deemed j~.!awfui.
to the officers designated and authorized by law to collect the sar^e; and
thereupon the party so paying or his legal representative may bring an
action in the tax division of the appropriate district court against the officer
to whom said tax or license was paid, or against the state, count;*, municipality or other taxing unit on whose behalf the same was collected, to.
recover said tax or license or any portion thereof paid under protest.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

71-12-31. Within six months.—Within six months :
An action against an officer, or an officer de facto:
(1) To recover any goods, wares, merchandise or other property
seized by any such officer in his official capacity as tax collector, or to
recover the price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise or other
personal property so seized, or for damages for the seizure, detention,
sale of, or injury to, any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal
property seized, or for damages done to any person or property in
making any such seizure.
(2) For money paid to any such officer under protest, or seized by
such officer in his official capacity, as a collector of taxes, and which, it
is claimed, ought to be refunded.

